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Rule 23 Criminal Criminal Law 1st District

People v. Canteberry

Court IL Appellate, 1st District
Filed Tuesday, June 30, 2026
Citation 2026 IL App (1st) 232381

Key Takeaways

  • 1 A drive-stun Taser does not render physical resistance involuntary; aggravated battery conviction affirmed.
  • 2 Forcible resistance to even an unlawful arrest by a known officer satisfies the 'authorized act' element of resisting a peace officer.
  • 3 Relevant for criminal defense attorneys litigating Taser-related battery charges, resisting arrest defenses, and Brady impeachment claims involving officer misconduct.

Summary

On January 12, 2020, Sauk Village police responded to a domestic disturbance and attempted to arrest Emmanuel Canteberry after he took his girlfriend's car keys and refused to return them. During the arrest, officers deployed a Taser in drive-stun mode, after which Canteberry grabbed Officer Langan's vest and pulled him to the ground. Following a bench trial, Canteberry was convicted of three counts of aggravated battery and one count of resisting a peace officer and sentenced to concurrent 24-month probation terms. He appealed, raising three issues: whether his conduct was involuntary due to the Taser, whether the officers lacked probable cause rendering the arrest unauthorized, and whether the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose that Officer Langan had accidentally shot an unarmed juvenile in an unrelated 2022 incident.

The First District affirmed on all counts. On the battery charge, the court distinguished drive-stun deployment — a pain compliance tool that does not override the central nervous system — from probe-based Tasing, which does cause involuntary muscle contractions. Canteberry's continued resistance before and after the drive-stun, his verbal protests, and his denial of any contact at trial all supported the trial court's voluntariness finding. On resisting arrest, the court reaffirmed that under 720 ILCS 5/7-7 and City of Champaign v. Torres, a person may not forcibly resist even an unlawful arrest by a known peace officer. The court also found probable cause independently supported the arrest.

On the Brady claim, the court found Canteberry could not establish materiality. Officer Langan's testimony was corroborated by physical evidence and mirrored Officer Morris' account, against whom no impeachment was raised. The court also doubted the shooting evidence would have been admissible impeachment absent any resulting discipline or criminal charges. Practitioners should note the court's careful analysis distinguishing drive-stun from probe Tasing for voluntariness purposes, and its strict application of Brady's materiality element where corroborating evidence is strong.

Key Holdings

1. A Taser deployed in drive-stun mode does not override the central nervous system and is unlikely to cause involuntary physical movement; a defendant who grabs and pulls an officer to the ground following a drive-stun acts voluntarily for purposes of aggravated battery under 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4).

2. Under 720 ILCS 5/7-7 and City of Champaign v. Torres, 214 Ill. 2d 234 (2005), a person may not use force to resist arrest by a known peace officer even if the arrest is believed to be or is in fact unlawful; an unlawful arrest still constitutes an 'authorized act' under the resisting a peace officer statute.

3. Officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for theft where, at 3:20 a.m., defendant immediately seized his girlfriend's car keys upon arrival, she reported the taking to officers, and defendant repeatedly refused to return them while continuing to attempt entry into the residence.

4. A Brady claim fails on materiality where the allegedly suppressed impeachment evidence — an officer's involvement in an unrelated shooting resulting in no discipline or criminal charges — would likely be inadmissible, and the officer's trial testimony was independently corroborated by physical evidence and a second officer's virtually identical account.