Village of Downers Grove v. Beckham
Key Takeaways
- 1 Section 11-31-1(d) requires only that notice be sent by certified mail, not proof of actual receipt.
- 2 Attorney affidavit attesting to certified mail delivery suffices to support issuance of a judicial deed.
- 3 Relevant for real estate and municipal attorneys handling abandoned property proceedings and judicial deed petitions under the Illinois Municipal Code.
Summary
The Village of Downers Grove filed a petition for equitable relief in Du Page County Circuit Court seeking demolition and a declaration of abandonment of property at 6610 Dunham Road, along with issuance of a judicial deed under section 11-31-1(d) of the Illinois Municipal Code. After the circuit court declared the property abandoned in January 2025 and initially denied the Village's petition for a judicial deed without prejudice, the Village filed an amended petition supported by an attorney affidavit attesting to certified mail notice sent to all parties with a record interest. The circuit court granted the amended petition on May 13, 2025, and Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC appealed, arguing the Village failed to prove actual delivery or receipt of notice.
The Third District Appellate Court affirmed, applying de novo review to the statutory construction question. The court held that the plain language of section 11-31-1(d) requires only that notice be 'sent' by certified or registered mail — it imposes no proof-of-receipt condition. The court reinforced this reading through the canon that the legislature's omission of a return-receipt requirement at the judicial deed stage — present elsewhere in the statute — was intentional. The court also applied the Foutch presumption, noting the absence of a transcript required it to presume the circuit court acted in conformity with the law.
For practitioners, this decision clarifies that municipalities need not demonstrate actual delivery of notice to obtain a judicial deed under section 11-31-1(d). An attorney affidavit confirming certified mail dispatch is sufficient, and a lienholder's failure to contest actual receipt further undermines any notice-based challenge.
Key Holdings
1. Section 11-31-1(d) of the Illinois Municipal Code does not require a municipality to prove actual delivery or receipt of notice as a precondition to obtaining a judicial deed following a declaration of abandonment — the statute requires only that notice be sent by certified or registered mail.
2. A municipality satisfies the notice requirements of section 11-31-1(d) by submitting an attorney affidavit attesting that certified mail notices were sent to all persons having an interest of record in the property.
3. The legislature's inclusion of a 'return receipt requested' requirement in section 11-31-1(e)(1) and a 'service of process' requirement at the petition-for-abandonment stage, while omitting any proof-of-receipt requirement at the judicial deed stage, demonstrates an intentional and purposeful legislative choice.
4. Where the record on appeal lacks transcripts of circuit court proceedings, the Foutch presumption applies and the appellate court will presume the circuit court acted in conformity with the law.