People v. Hill
Key Takeaways
- 1 Section 31-1(d) does not create an additional element or exception the State must prove in resisting-arrest prosecutions.
- 2 Resisting arrest remains a criminal act independent of the underlying arrest's lawfulness under Illinois law.
- 3 Relevant for criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors handling resisting or obstructing peace officer charges in Illinois.
Summary
Renitta D. Hill was convicted after a Will County bench trial of one count of resisting a peace officer under 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a), based on evidence that she pulled her arms away from a sergeant attempting to handcuff her. She was sentenced to 12 months' conditional discharge. On appeal to the Third District, Hill argued that section 31-1(d) of the Criminal Code of 2012 — added by a 2021 amendment — either created an additional element of the offense or an affirmative exception requiring the State to prove she was subject to arrest for a predicate offense before she could be convicted of resisting arrest.
The appellate court rejected both arguments, adopting the reasoning of the First District's recent decision in People v. Carswell, 2026 IL App (1st) 231884. Applying plain-language statutory construction, the court held that section 31-1(d) does not describe the offense and does not expressly create an exception to criminal liability. The court further reasoned that construing subsection (d) as a defense would conflict with section 7-7 of the Code, which prohibits the use of force to resist even an unlawful arrest by a known officer, and would improperly sanction self-help resistance condemned in People v. Locken.
For practicing attorneys, this decision confirms that a defendant's guilt under section 31-1(a) is not contingent on the validity or existence of a predicate offense. Defense counsel cannot defeat a resisting-arrest charge solely by challenging the lawfulness of the underlying arrest, and prosecutors need not prove a predicate offense as an element of the charge.
Key Holdings
1. Section 31-1(d) of the Criminal Code of 2012 does not constitute an additional element of, or an exception to, the offense of resisting a peace officer under section 31-1(a); the State is not required to prove a predicate offense to obtain a conviction.
2. Resisting arrest is a criminal act independent of the lawfulness of the underlying arrest, consistent with section 7-7 of the Code and People v. Locken, which prohibit the use of force to resist even an unlawful arrest by a known officer.
3. Construing section 31-1(d) as a defense or exception would improperly permit self-help resistance in contravention of section 7-7 and would add an unintended limitation to the statute.
4. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge premised solely on the State's failure to prove a predicate offense under section 31-1(d) necessarily fails where that subsection creates no additional element or exception.