Administrative District Council 1 of Illinois of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers v. Przada
Key Takeaways
- 1 Under the Employee Classification Act, only aggrieved persons—not 'interested parties'—may collect statutory damages and attorney fees.
- 2 A union suing as an interested party cannot recover section 60(a) relief absent an allegation that its own rights were violated.
- 3 Relevant for labor and employment attorneys litigating Employee Classification Act claims on behalf of unions or other interested parties.
Summary
Administrative District Council 1 filed suit in Cook County against Brickster Inc. and its principal, Grzegorz Przada, under section 60 of the Illinois Employee Classification Act, alleging misclassification of workers as independent contractors. After repeated discovery violations, the circuit court entered a default judgment as a Rule 219(c) sanction and ultimately awarded Przada $526,500 in statutory damages under section 60(a)(2) and $147,265.92 in attorney fees and costs under section 60(a)(4) and Rule 219(c). Przada appealed. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as to Brickster Inc. for lack of jurisdiction because Brickster Inc. failed to timely appeal the October 2023 final judgment entered against it.
On the merits, the court applied de novo statutory interpretation and held that section 60(a)'s third sentence limits entitlement to collect the enumerated relief—including statutory damages and attorney fees—to '[a] person whose rights have been violated under this Act,' i.e., an aggrieved person. Although the Act's first sentence permits both 'interested parties' and 'aggrieved persons' to file suit, the legislature did not extend the right to collect relief to interested parties. The court found further support in section 40(b), which separately provides a 10% bounty to interested parties from civil penalties, demonstrating a deliberate legislative distinction. Accordingly, the court reversed the awards under section 60(a)(2) and 60(a)(4) but affirmed the Rule 219(c) fee award, which Przada did not challenge.
For practitioners, this decision significantly limits the remedies available to unions and other interested parties bringing Employee Classification Act claims in their own right. While such parties retain standing to sue, they cannot recover statutory damages or attorney fees under section 60 unless they can establish that their own rights under the Act were violated.
Key Holdings
1. The appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal by a party that failed to timely appeal a final judgment entered with a Rule 304(a) finding.
2. Under section 60(a) of the Employee Classification Act, only a person whose rights have been violated under the Act—an aggrieved person—may collect statutory damages under section 60(a)(2) or attorney fees and costs under section 60(a)(4); an 'interested party' that has not alleged a violation of its own statutory rights is not entitled to that relief.
3. Section 40(b) of the Act, which provides a separate 10% bounty to interested parties from civil penalties, confirms the legislature deliberately distinguished between remedies available to interested parties and those available to aggrieved persons.
4. An award of attorney fees and costs imposed as a Rule 219(c) discovery sanction is a separate and independent basis for fees, unaffected by the limitations of section 60(a)(4), and will be affirmed where the appellant does not challenge it on appeal.