Rafaela Colaizzi filed an optometric malpractice suit in Cook County on behalf of her minor son Joshua, alleging vision loss and a corneal transplant resulting from negligent treatment by a For Eyes optometrist in Bloomingdale, DuPage County. Defendants For Eyes Optical Company and Luxottica of America moved to transfer venue to DuPage County on intrastate forum non conveniens grounds. The circuit court denied the motion, and defendants sought interlocutory review under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2).

The First District affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion. On the private interest factors, the court emphasized that Joshua's Cook County treating physicians were not strategically selected by his mother — a For Eyes optometrist in DuPage County had directed the family to Suburban Associates in Arlington Heights, Cook County. For Eyes identified no nonparty defense witnesses capable of testifying on causation or damages. The court also rejected arguments about travel time and mileage differences of approximately six miles and six minutes between courthouses as the 'battle over minutiae' cautioned against by the Illinois Supreme Court. On public interest factors, the court found both counties had genuine interests, and Cook County's court congestion data — showing an average verdict lapse time of 43.4 months versus DuPage County's 59.3 months — actually favored retaining the case in Cook County.

Practically, the decision reinforces that defendants bear a heavy burden to overcome a plaintiff's chosen forum, that new evidence or statistics cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal, and that minor geographic differences between adjoining counties will rarely justify transfer.

E.A. is an orphaned minor whose maternal grandparents and paternal aunt and uncle each petitioned for plenary guardianship in the Circuit Court of Cook County. After a six-day evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the grandparents' petition and appointed Uncle as sole guardian. The grandparents appealed, arguing the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the court applied an improper legal standard by focusing on strained adult relationships rather than E.A.'s best interest.

The appellate court affirmed, applying the best interest factors from In re Estate of Suggs and emphasizing the circuit court's inherent plenary power — rooted in common law and equity — to appoint guardians of minors independent of any statute. The court rejected the grandparents' arguments that either the Juvenile Court Act's best interest factors or the Probate Act's revocation-of-letters factors should govern, finding both arguments forfeited and legally inapplicable. The court upheld the circuit court's reliance on the GAL's credible testimony regarding the grandparents' lack of behavioral boundaries, their failure to foster E.A.'s relationship with his only sibling, and the risk that E.A. — already having lost both parents — could suffer devastating loss if his nearly-70-years-older grandparents predeceased him.

For practitioners, this case clarifies that Illinois circuit courts are not bound by any statutory framework when adjudicating minor guardianship proceedings, and that the Suggs best interest factors govern. It also underscores that arguments not raised below and unsupported by cited authority will be forfeited on appeal.

In this medical negligence action arising from alleged failure to timely diagnose a subdural hemorrhage, plaintiff sought credentialing records for six providers at Advocate Sherman Hospital. After the trial court overruled Sherman Hospital's privilege objections and ordered production, Sherman Hospital produced over 2,000 pages with redactions and asserted the Medical Studies Act privilege over withheld materials. The trial court conducted an in camera review of those pages without affidavits from Sherman Hospital, ultimately overruling the privilege as to 14 specific pages. When Sherman Hospital refused to produce those pages, the trial court entered a non-friendly civil contempt order imposing escalating fines to facilitate interlocutory appeal.

The First District affirmed the underlying privilege ruling, holding that Sherman Hospital failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the 14 disputed pages were initiated, created, prepared, or generated by a peer-review committee. The court emphasized that merely showing documents served an integral function in the peer-review process is insufficient — the documents must actually originate from that process. Critically, the court clarified that submitting thousands of pages for in camera review without supporting affidavits is procedurally inadequate; a trial court may properly either demand affidavits or overrule the privilege claim for lack of substantiation.

The court vacated the contempt order and monetary penalty, reaffirming that a party seeking a contempt order in good faith to enable interlocutory appeal of a discovery ruling is not acting contemptuously, and the order should be vacated regardless of whether the underlying ruling is affirmed. Attorneys invoking the Medical Studies Act privilege should file detailed affidavits alongside any in camera submission to avoid waiving the privilege by inadequate substantiation.

This opinion from Rule 23 was filed on 2026-06-22. The case "People v. Mallo, 2026 IL App (2d) 250399" (Docket: 2026 IL App (2d) 250399) addresses important legal issues. Due to technical difficulties, the full AI summary is temporarily unavailable. Please review the full opinion for complete details.

James E. Brown, Jr. was convicted by a Kendall County jury of two counts of first-degree murder for the November 2020 shooting deaths of Cassandra and Changina Chatman. The jury also found that Brown personally discharged the firearm causing both deaths. Following denial of his post-trial motion, Brown was sentenced to mandatory natural life imprisonment and appealed, arguing his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request a Frye hearing, failing to object to the State's firearms identification expert on foundation grounds, and failing to cross-examine that expert regarding purported reliability issues in firearms identification methodology.

The Second District affirmed on all three grounds, applying the two-prong Strickland standard. The court held that firearms identification testimony has been uniformly admitted in Illinois since at least 1930 and is not a 'new' or 'novel' scientific methodology triggering Frye review, rendering any such motion futile. The court distinguished a Cook County circuit court ruling excluding such testimony under IRE 403 on case-specific facts, noting that decision expressly acknowledged the general admissibility of firearms identification evidence remains settled. The court further found adequate foundation in the expert's testimony regarding his training, methodology, use of comparative microscopy, and field consensus, distinguishing People v. Petrie where the expert's basis was unclear.

This decision is significant for criminal defense attorneys because it reinforces that challenges to firearms identification expert testimony based on Frye, foundation, or cross-examination on reliability are unlikely to succeed in Illinois appellate courts under current precedent, and that failing to raise such challenges does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

In People v. Harwell, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of two counts of battery for spraying the complaining witness, Jewell Davis, with pepper spray near her vehicle. The circuit court found Davis credible and rejected the defendant's and her witness's accounts as incredible. The defendant was sentenced to one year of conditional discharge. On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and raised four specific factual arguments, including that Davis's testimony was inconsistent with the laws of nature and universal human experience.

The Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, affirmed. Applying the Collins standard, the court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of battery proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that corroborating officer testimony and body camera footage supported Davis's account, and that the trier of fact was free to credit one witness over another. The court also declined to consider information from a pepper spray manufacturer's website cited in the defendant's brief, as well as the absence of evidence regarding effects on Davis's daughter, because neither was presented or admitted at trial, relying on People v. Johnson, 2026 IL 131337.

This case is significant for practitioners because it reinforces the high deference afforded to trial court credibility findings on sufficiency review and clarifies that appellate courts cannot consider extra-record materials — even publicly available information — when evaluating whether evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Austin Smith was charged in Kane County with eight Class 2 felony counts of possession of child sexual abuse material (CSAM). On the day of charging, the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release, which the trial court granted. After Smith's motion for relief was denied, he appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, challenging the pretrial detention order.

The central issue on appeal was whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption great that Smith committed a detainable offense — specifically, whether the images described in the police synopsis and charging documents constituted CSAM under 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(vii), which requires a 'lewd exhibition' of unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or breasts. Applying the six-factor Lamborn test for lewdness, the court found that the described images — children naked at a beach, pool, splash pad, or bathtub — satisfied only the nudity factor and none of the remaining five factors. The court also rejected the State's reliance on Smith's and his mother's own references to the images as CSAM, reasoning that a layperson's characterization does not satisfy the statutory definition.

The court reversed the detention order and remanded with directions to impose conditions of pretrial release. This decision is significant for defense attorneys challenging CSAM charges or pretrial detention petitions, as it reinforces that nudity alone cannot establish the lewdness element and that lay characterizations of images are legally insufficient to meet the State's burden.

On July 6, 2024, Will County Deputy Albin arrested Jermain Cervantes for DUI after observing his vehicle cross the white shoulder line multiple times. At the suppression hearing, the circuit court granted Cervantes's motion to quash the arrest, finding the State failed to rebut his prima facie showing that probable cause was lacking. The State appealed, filing a certificate of substantial impairment, and the Third District reversed.

The central issue on appeal was whether Deputy Albin had probable cause to arrest Cervantes for DUI under the totality of the circumstances. Reviewing the ultimate suppression ruling de novo, the appellate court identified ten factors supporting probable cause: significant lane departures, bloodshot and glassy eyes, odor of alcohol, an open beer bottle in the vehicle, Cervantes's admission of consuming four or five beers, a time misstatement of over two hours, clues on all three standardized field sobriety tests, and his refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test—which the court characterized as consciousness of guilt. The court also faulted the circuit court for failing to address the video evidence of impaired driving.

Practically, this decision reinforces that Illinois courts apply a commonsense totality-of-the-circumstances standard for DUI probable cause, and that multiple moderate indicators collectively can suffice even absent classic signs like slurred speech. It also confirms that failure to challenge field sobriety test foundation at the trial level forfeits the issue on appeal.

Corey Truman was convicted by a Cook County jury of child pornography production and distributing harmful material, receiving an aggregate seven-year prison sentence. On appeal, Truman raised two prosecutorial misconduct claims arising from closing argument, both of which were forfeited at trial and reviewed under plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel standards.

First, Truman argued the State misstated the evidence by describing a video as depicting a woman 'grinding' or 'dry humping' the minor victim. The First District rejected this claim, finding the characterization was at least a reasonable inference from the video evidence, which showed the woman bending over and moving her hips against the victim. Even assuming impropriety, the court held that the trial court's standard jury instructions — that closing arguments are not evidence — cured any potential prejudice. Second, Truman argued the State improperly impugned defense counsel's integrity by remarking that counsel had the 'audacity' to ask the jury to 'do the right thing.' The court found no error, holding the comment was a direct and permissible response to defense counsel's own closing argument using that same phrase, and did not attribute fabrication, deception, or ethical misconduct to counsel.

Because no error was found on either issue, neither plain error nor Strickland ineffective assistance could be established. The court affirmed both convictions. Practitioners should note that forfeiture remains a significant barrier and that curative jury instructions continue to carry substantial weight in defeating prosecutorial misconduct claims.

Daniel Solano, a commercial truck driver, received a $2,655 citation under Chicago Municipal Code § 9-72-080 for operating an overweight tractor-trailer. Before any DOAH hearing occurred, Solano filed suit in Cook County Circuit Court seeking a declaration that Chicago's administrative adjudication of weight violations carrying fines over $250 was preempted by Vehicle Code sections 11-208.2 and 11-208.3, and asserting an unjust enrichment claim. The circuit court dismissed both counts with prejudice on the merits, and Solano appealed.

The First District affirmed on all counts. The court held that Solano's jurisdictional challenge was ripe — presenting a pure legal question and sufficient hardship — and that the exhaustion doctrine did not bar review of a challenge to DOAH's jurisdiction. On the merits, the court found that weight violations are a distinct statutory category separate from the standing, parking, compliance, red-light camera, and speed camera violations enumerated in section 11-208.3. Neither section 11-208.2 nor 11-208.3 contains any express limitation on Chicago's home rule authority to adjudicate weight violations, and Vehicle Code § 6-204(a)(2) expressly treats weight violations as a category separate from standing and parking. The unjust enrichment claim failed because it depended entirely on DOAH lacking adjudicatory authority.

The court expressly declined to address whether the City's enforcement mechanisms — specifically use of the section 11-208.3 pathway to convert DOAH orders into circuit court judgments — are subject to any statutory cap, finding that question premature where no hearing had occurred and no fine had been imposed. Attorneys representing commercial carriers or municipalities should note that enforcement mechanism challenges remain available after a completed administrative proceeding.

Andre Wardell was convicted after a Cook County bench trial of two counts of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to consecutive eight-year terms. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on count I, arguing that his girlfriend's alibi testimony — placing him elsewhere on December 31, 2020, and January 1, 2021 — contradicted the victim A.R.'s account that the first assault occurred 'around New Year's.' He also argued the trial court committed plain error by relying on a fact not in evidence when inferring the assault's date, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve that issue.

The Illinois First District Appellate Court affirmed on all counts. As to sufficiency, the court held that A.R.'s credible testimony alone was sufficient to convict, that a witness's inability to recall an exact date does not create reasonable doubt, and that the date of the offense is not an essential element of criminal sexual assault where no limitations issue exists. The trial court reasonably inferred the assault occurred on another night within the charged date range of December 1, 2020, through May 20, 2021. As to plain error, the court found no underlying error because the trial court's inference was grounded in A.R.'s testimony and the charging documents — not facts outside the record. With no underlying error established, the ineffective assistance claim also failed.

This decision is particularly useful for criminal defense attorneys litigating sexual assault appeals where victims testify to approximate rather than precise dates, and for understanding the limits of plain error review when challenging a trial court's factual inferences.

Glenn Robinson was convicted of multiple counts of attempt first degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm and sentenced in 2015 to natural life in prison as a habitual criminal under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a), based on two prior Class X armed robbery convictions. Robinson filed a postconviction petition arguing his sentence was illegal because one predicate offense occurred before he turned 21, relying on a 2021 legislative amendment and appellate decisions extending People v. Stewart's clarification rationale to subsection (a). The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition at the first stage, and the appellate court initially reversed in part. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of People v. Brown, 2026 IL 130930.

On remand, the central issue was whether Robinson's petition presented an arguable basis in law sufficient to survive first-stage summary dismissal. The appellate court held it did not. In Brown, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the 2021 amendment did not clarify the pre-existing meaning of subsection (a) — as it had clarified subsection (b) in Stewart — because the prior meaning of subsection (a) was inconsistent with the amendment. Brown also expressly overruled People v. Durant, the primary appellate authority supporting Robinson's claim.

Because the caselaw underpinning Robinson's petition was overruled, his claim no longer had even an arguable foothold in the law, and summary dismissal was proper. Defense attorneys should note that Brown effectively closes the door on retroactive challenges to pre-amendment habitual criminal sentences under subsection (a) based on the age-of-first-offense argument.

In this parentage action under the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, the circuit court of Cook County entered an allocation of parental responsibilities, parenting plan, and child support orders on April 24, 2024. Respondent Sarah Brown, the biological mother, failed to file a timely notice of appeal within 30 days as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a), and also failed to file a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal by the June 24, 2024 deadline imposed by Rule 303(d). Instead, Brown filed her motion for leave on May 28, 2025 — more than a year after the orders were entered. The appellate court had initially granted that motion on June 4, 2025, but upon further review vacated that order as improvidently granted.

The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, emphasizing that it has no authority to excuse a party's failure to comply with supreme court rules governing appellate deadlines. The court also found that Brown's brief failed to satisfy nearly every requirement of Rule 341(h), including the absence of a jurisdictional statement, cogent argument, accurate statement of facts, and identification of relief sought. Although the court acknowledged it could dismiss on briefing deficiencies alone, it declined to do so, resting dismissal solely on jurisdictional grounds.

This case serves as a critical reminder that appellate deadlines in family law matters are strictly enforced, that courts have an independent duty to assess jurisdiction, and that even a previously granted order allowing a late appeal can be vacated if the underlying motion was itself untimely.

Jermaine Evans was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 100 years in IDOC. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and two prior postconviction proceedings failed, Evans moved in April 2024 for leave to file a third postconviction petition alleging a Brady violation based on a police 'street file' discovered by attorney H. Candace Gorman. The trial court denied the motion, and Evans appealed.

The central legal issue was whether Evans could establish 'cause' under the cause-and-prejudice test of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)). The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that cause must be measured against any earlier postconviction proceeding — not solely the initial petition. Because Evans received Gorman's letter in December 2015, more than a year before he moved for leave to file his second postconviction petition in December 2016, he could have raised the Brady claim in that earlier proceeding but did not. The court rejected Evans's argument that cause always refers back only to the initial petition, finding that interpretation would produce absurd results and enable the piecemeal litigation the Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned.

A special concurrence by Justice Mikva agreed with the judgment but would have resolved the appeal on the prejudice prong, reasoning that a letter merely confirming a street file's existence — without disclosing its contents — is insufficient to make a prima facie showing of prejudice. The special concurrence also disagreed with the majority's suggestion that circuit courts retain discretion to deny leave even after a defendant satisfies the cause-and-prejudice test.

In December 2022, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship after Elizabeth V. was found unresponsive in a motel room with her daughter E.V. present, having tested positive for cocaine. E.V. was placed with DCFS and subsequently adjudicated abused and neglected. After the permanency goal changed to substitute care pending termination in June 2024, the State filed a termination petition. Following a fitness hearing, the circuit court found Elizabeth unfit under grounds (b) and (m) of the Adoption Act and, after a best interest hearing, terminated her parental rights. Elizabeth appealed both findings.

The appellate court affirmed the unfitness finding under ground (b) — failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility — applying the manifest weight of the evidence standard. Key evidence included over 20 months of repeated positive drug tests, completion of only parenting classes out of all recommended services, multiple discharges from treatment programs, refusal of inpatient treatment, and lack of transparency with service providers. The court held that Elizabeth's late progress after the termination petition was filed did not outweigh her prior demonstrated lack of responsibility. Having affirmed on ground (b), the court declined to address ground (m) arguments or the constitutional challenge, invoking the principle that courts avoid constitutional questions when a case can be resolved on other grounds.

On best interest, the court affirmed termination, finding E.V. had a strong bond with her foster mother Katie V., who met all of E.V.'s needs and sought adoption. Attorneys should note that late-stage service compliance will not overcome an extended record of non-engagement, and that affirmance on a single unfitness ground forecloses appellate review of remaining grounds.

Ernest David Levert Jr. suffered a severe stroke in April 2024 and was transferred to Chicago for treatment. His mother, Dr. Rhonda Hagey-Levert, was appointed temporary guardian in October 2024. His wife, Ivory Levert, created and managed a GoFundMe campaign linked to a joint bank account she held with Ernest. Ernest died in January 2025. After his death, Rhonda filed a petition for reimbursement of $119,442.93 in care expenses, asking the circuit court to direct Ivory to pay from the GoFundMe funds. The circuit court granted the petition and ordered Ivory to pay. Ivory appealed.

The Illinois First District reversed, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to order reimbursement from the GoFundMe funds because those funds were never properly brought into Ernest's guardianship estate. The court identified the citation proceeding under section 16-1 of the Probate Act as the required mechanism for determining whether third-party-held funds belong to an estate, a procedure Rhonda never invoked. Because probate administration is a proceeding in rem acting on the estate as the res, personal jurisdiction over Ivory alone could not supply the missing authority. Merely listing the GoFundMe campaign as a 'believed' asset in a report in lieu of accounting was insufficient to bring it within the court's jurisdiction.

For practitioners, this decision underscores that guardians and estate representatives must follow the Probate Act's citation procedure to marshal disputed assets into an estate before seeking reimbursement from those assets. Equitable concerns, however compelling, cannot override the statutory framework.

Kevin John Kohnen died domiciled in Illinois in September 2022, leaving a will that made no provision for his wife Deborah, who was in the midst of divorcing him. After the will was admitted to probate, Deborah renounced it, entitling her to a statutory spousal share under 755 ILCS 5/2-8(a). Kevin's children, Ethan and Jordan, moved in the Circuit Court of McHenry County for a declaration that the proceeds from Kevin's Arizona real property—acquired before the marriage—should be excluded from the 'entire estate' used to calculate Deborah's share. The trial court denied the motion, ruling the Arizona property would be probated in Illinois and included in the estate. Ethan and Jordan appealed.

The Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, reversed and remanded. Applying In re Estate of Pericles, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1096 (1994), and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 242, the court held that the law of the situs—Arizona—governs interests in real property located there, and therefore the Arizona property is not part of Kevin's 'entire estate' for section 2-8(a) purposes. Because Arizona does not provide a forced spousal share, Deborah has no claim to those proceeds under that framework. The court rejected Deborah's arguments based on Arizona Revised Statutes § 14-2401 and Arizona's simplified ancillary administration procedure as insufficient to overcome the prima facie case for reversal.

Because no appellee's brief was filed, the court applied the Talandis standard, reversing upon finding a prima facie showing of reversible error supported by the record. Probate attorneys handling multi-state estates should carefully analyze situs law when calculating a surviving spouse's forced share, as Illinois domicile law will not automatically govern out-of-state real property.

Juanita Sullivan and John Sullivan divorced in 2009, with their marital settlement agreement awarding Juanita a 50% share of John's pension plans. After two prior appellate rulings — in 2018 and 2020 — established that Juanita had no current right to John's disability pension benefits, she nonetheless filed a petition for rule to show cause in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking to hold the Pension Fund in indirect civil contempt for refusing to pay her half of those benefits. The trial court denied the petition and imposed Rule 137 sanctions of $17,295.42 in attorney's fees and costs against Juanita. She appealed both rulings, and the Pension Fund cross-moved for Rule 375 appellate sanctions.

The First District affirmed on all counts. On the contempt petition, the court applied the law of the case doctrine, holding that because the identical facts and legal issues had been resolved against Juanita in two prior appeals, those rulings were binding and controlling. On sanctions, the court found no abuse of discretion where Juanita had repeated previously rejected arguments and attempted to hold the Pension Fund in contempt for complying with existing court orders. The court declined to impose Rule 375 appellate sanctions, extending leniency to Juanita as a pro se litigant potentially unfamiliar with the law of the case doctrine, but warned that further relitigation may not receive the same treatment.

This case is a strong reminder that the law of the case doctrine operates as a firm bar to relitigating settled issues, and that pursuing contempt against a party complying with court orders can expose a litigant to Rule 137 sanctions.

Hector Luvianos was arrested in December 2025 and charged with two counts of first degree murder for killing his wife, Noemi Parada Narvaez, in Kane County. The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release under section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which the trial court granted. After Luvianos filed a motion for relief under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h), the trial court denied relief following a March 2026 hearing. Luvianos appealed, arguing the State failed to meet its burden on both dangerousness and the no-conditions prong.

The appellate court affirmed on both issues, applying de novo review because the parties proceeded solely by proffer and documentary evidence. On dangerousness, the court held that the nature and circumstances of the offense — a proper statutory factor — amply supported the finding. Luvianos stabbed Narvaez 40-55 times across multiple vital areas and struck her repeatedly with a hammer until the hammerhead separated. His statement to police that he wanted to kill her and slit her throat, combined with consuming approximately eight drinks beforehand and a prior DUI, further demonstrated an inability to control himself while drinking.

On the no-conditions prong, the court found that because the killing occurred at Luvianos's own residence using common household items, no conditions could prevent his access to similar weapons or to people who might provoke him. His proposal to work at a restaurant — where knives are readily available — underscored the inadequacy of electronic monitoring. The extreme violence reflected a severe lack of restraint that pretrial conditions cannot remedy.

In People v. Davidson, the Fifth District Appellate Court addressed two issues arising from a Class 4 felony conviction for tampering with a security fire or life safety system. After a second jury trial in which the defendant represented himself, appointed counsel was provided for sentencing. Following sentencing, appointed counsel declined to adopt the defendant's pro se motion to reconsider sentence, and the defendant proceeded pro se at subsequent hearings without objection. The defendant also filed an unsworn affidavit alleging ineffective assistance of both appointed counsels, which the trial court never specifically addressed through a Krankel inquiry.

On appeal, the defendant argued he was forced to proceed pro se without a proper waiver of counsel and that the trial court failed to conduct a required Krankel inquiry. The court affirmed on the first issue, applying the invited error doctrine. Because the defendant made no objection to proceeding pro se, never withdrew his pro se appearance, and actively argued his motion without requesting counsel, the court held it was disingenuous to claim on appeal he was forced to proceed pro se — forfeiting even plain error review. On the second issue, the court remanded for a limited Krankel preliminary inquiry, a concession the State joined.

For practicing attorneys, Davidson reinforces that a defendant's affirmative election to proceed pro se — even absent a formal waiver colloquy — can foreclose appellate relief. It also confirms that any pro se post-trial filing alleging ineffective assistance, however informal, triggers the trial court's mandatory Krankel inquiry obligation.