Daniel Solano, a commercial truck driver, received a $2,655 citation under Chicago Municipal Code § 9-72-080 for operating an overweight tractor-trailer. Before any DOAH hearing occurred, Solano filed suit in Cook County Circuit Court seeking a declaration that Chicago's administrative adjudication of weight violations carrying fines over $250 was preempted by Vehicle Code sections 11-208.2 and 11-208.3, and asserting an unjust enrichment claim. The circuit court dismissed both counts with prejudice on the merits, and Solano appealed.

The First District affirmed on all counts. The court held that Solano's jurisdictional challenge was ripe — presenting a pure legal question and sufficient hardship — and that the exhaustion doctrine did not bar review of a challenge to DOAH's jurisdiction. On the merits, the court found that weight violations are a distinct statutory category separate from the standing, parking, compliance, red-light camera, and speed camera violations enumerated in section 11-208.3. Neither section 11-208.2 nor 11-208.3 contains any express limitation on Chicago's home rule authority to adjudicate weight violations, and Vehicle Code § 6-204(a)(2) expressly treats weight violations as a category separate from standing and parking. The unjust enrichment claim failed because it depended entirely on DOAH lacking adjudicatory authority.

The court expressly declined to address whether the City's enforcement mechanisms — specifically use of the section 11-208.3 pathway to convert DOAH orders into circuit court judgments — are subject to any statutory cap, finding that question premature where no hearing had occurred and no fine had been imposed. Attorneys representing commercial carriers or municipalities should note that enforcement mechanism challenges remain available after a completed administrative proceeding.

In this parentage action under the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, the circuit court of Cook County entered an allocation of parental responsibilities, parenting plan, and child support orders on April 24, 2024. Respondent Sarah Brown, the biological mother, failed to file a timely notice of appeal within 30 days as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a), and also failed to file a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal by the June 24, 2024 deadline imposed by Rule 303(d). Instead, Brown filed her motion for leave on May 28, 2025 — more than a year after the orders were entered. The appellate court had initially granted that motion on June 4, 2025, but upon further review vacated that order as improvidently granted.

The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, emphasizing that it has no authority to excuse a party's failure to comply with supreme court rules governing appellate deadlines. The court also found that Brown's brief failed to satisfy nearly every requirement of Rule 341(h), including the absence of a jurisdictional statement, cogent argument, accurate statement of facts, and identification of relief sought. Although the court acknowledged it could dismiss on briefing deficiencies alone, it declined to do so, resting dismissal solely on jurisdictional grounds.

This case serves as a critical reminder that appellate deadlines in family law matters are strictly enforced, that courts have an independent duty to assess jurisdiction, and that even a previously granted order allowing a late appeal can be vacated if the underlying motion was itself untimely.

In December 2022, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship after Elizabeth V. was found unresponsive in a motel room with her daughter E.V. present, having tested positive for cocaine. E.V. was placed with DCFS and subsequently adjudicated abused and neglected. After the permanency goal changed to substitute care pending termination in June 2024, the State filed a termination petition. Following a fitness hearing, the circuit court found Elizabeth unfit under grounds (b) and (m) of the Adoption Act and, after a best interest hearing, terminated her parental rights. Elizabeth appealed both findings.

The appellate court affirmed the unfitness finding under ground (b) — failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility — applying the manifest weight of the evidence standard. Key evidence included over 20 months of repeated positive drug tests, completion of only parenting classes out of all recommended services, multiple discharges from treatment programs, refusal of inpatient treatment, and lack of transparency with service providers. The court held that Elizabeth's late progress after the termination petition was filed did not outweigh her prior demonstrated lack of responsibility. Having affirmed on ground (b), the court declined to address ground (m) arguments or the constitutional challenge, invoking the principle that courts avoid constitutional questions when a case can be resolved on other grounds.

On best interest, the court affirmed termination, finding E.V. had a strong bond with her foster mother Katie V., who met all of E.V.'s needs and sought adoption. Attorneys should note that late-stage service compliance will not overcome an extended record of non-engagement, and that affirmance on a single unfitness ground forecloses appellate review of remaining grounds.

Ernest David Levert Jr. suffered a severe stroke in April 2024 and was transferred to Chicago for treatment. His mother, Dr. Rhonda Hagey-Levert, was appointed temporary guardian in October 2024. His wife, Ivory Levert, created and managed a GoFundMe campaign linked to a joint bank account she held with Ernest. Ernest died in January 2025. After his death, Rhonda filed a petition for reimbursement of $119,442.93 in care expenses, asking the circuit court to direct Ivory to pay from the GoFundMe funds. The circuit court granted the petition and ordered Ivory to pay. Ivory appealed.

The Illinois First District reversed, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to order reimbursement from the GoFundMe funds because those funds were never properly brought into Ernest's guardianship estate. The court identified the citation proceeding under section 16-1 of the Probate Act as the required mechanism for determining whether third-party-held funds belong to an estate, a procedure Rhonda never invoked. Because probate administration is a proceeding in rem acting on the estate as the res, personal jurisdiction over Ivory alone could not supply the missing authority. Merely listing the GoFundMe campaign as a 'believed' asset in a report in lieu of accounting was insufficient to bring it within the court's jurisdiction.

For practitioners, this decision underscores that guardians and estate representatives must follow the Probate Act's citation procedure to marshal disputed assets into an estate before seeking reimbursement from those assets. Equitable concerns, however compelling, cannot override the statutory framework.

Kevin John Kohnen died domiciled in Illinois in September 2022, leaving a will that made no provision for his wife Deborah, who was in the midst of divorcing him. After the will was admitted to probate, Deborah renounced it, entitling her to a statutory spousal share under 755 ILCS 5/2-8(a). Kevin's children, Ethan and Jordan, moved in the Circuit Court of McHenry County for a declaration that the proceeds from Kevin's Arizona real property—acquired before the marriage—should be excluded from the 'entire estate' used to calculate Deborah's share. The trial court denied the motion, ruling the Arizona property would be probated in Illinois and included in the estate. Ethan and Jordan appealed.

The Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, reversed and remanded. Applying In re Estate of Pericles, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1096 (1994), and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 242, the court held that the law of the situs—Arizona—governs interests in real property located there, and therefore the Arizona property is not part of Kevin's 'entire estate' for section 2-8(a) purposes. Because Arizona does not provide a forced spousal share, Deborah has no claim to those proceeds under that framework. The court rejected Deborah's arguments based on Arizona Revised Statutes § 14-2401 and Arizona's simplified ancillary administration procedure as insufficient to overcome the prima facie case for reversal.

Because no appellee's brief was filed, the court applied the Talandis standard, reversing upon finding a prima facie showing of reversible error supported by the record. Probate attorneys handling multi-state estates should carefully analyze situs law when calculating a surviving spouse's forced share, as Illinois domicile law will not automatically govern out-of-state real property.

Juanita Sullivan and John Sullivan divorced in 2009, with their marital settlement agreement awarding Juanita a 50% share of John's pension plans. After two prior appellate rulings — in 2018 and 2020 — established that Juanita had no current right to John's disability pension benefits, she nonetheless filed a petition for rule to show cause in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking to hold the Pension Fund in indirect civil contempt for refusing to pay her half of those benefits. The trial court denied the petition and imposed Rule 137 sanctions of $17,295.42 in attorney's fees and costs against Juanita. She appealed both rulings, and the Pension Fund cross-moved for Rule 375 appellate sanctions.

The First District affirmed on all counts. On the contempt petition, the court applied the law of the case doctrine, holding that because the identical facts and legal issues had been resolved against Juanita in two prior appeals, those rulings were binding and controlling. On sanctions, the court found no abuse of discretion where Juanita had repeated previously rejected arguments and attempted to hold the Pension Fund in contempt for complying with existing court orders. The court declined to impose Rule 375 appellate sanctions, extending leniency to Juanita as a pro se litigant potentially unfamiliar with the law of the case doctrine, but warned that further relitigation may not receive the same treatment.

This case is a strong reminder that the law of the case doctrine operates as a firm bar to relitigating settled issues, and that pursuing contempt against a party complying with court orders can expose a litigant to Rule 137 sanctions.

Alice D., a minor, was taken into DCFS custody in February 2023. After DNA testing excluded the named putative father, the State served 'any and all unknown fathers' by publication and obtained a default order terminating their parental rights in November 2024. Michael J., who later confirmed paternity through DNA testing, filed a section 2-1401 motion to vacate, alleging he had been deceived by the mother into believing another man was the biological father. The circuit court denied the motion, finding a diligent inquiry had been conducted and that Father failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense or due diligence. Father appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the State's inquiry—limited solely to asking the mother to identify possible fathers—fell far short of the diligent inquiry required by section 2-16(2) of the Juvenile Court Act before resorting to service by publication. Relying on In re C.K. and DCFS Administrative Procedure No. 22, the court found the State was also required to review agency and court files and to question available relatives, including the maternal grandparents who served as foster parents and had ongoing DCFS contact. Because the State failed to conduct a diligent inquiry, the circuit court never acquired personal jurisdiction over Father, rendering the default termination order void ab initio.

The court further held that because the order was void, Father was not required to demonstrate a meritorious defense or due diligence under section 2-1401—the allegation of voidness substitutes for those requirements. This decision is significant for practitioners navigating termination proceedings involving unknown or unlocated fathers, as it establishes that publication service requires meaningful investigative steps beyond a single inquiry to the mother.

Madhavi Ryali and Sunit Singla are divorced parents of two minor children governed by a 2018 Allocation Judgment. Following Madhavi's petitions to modify parenting arrangements and Sunit's petition for rule to show cause, the Du Page County circuit court held a five-day trial and issued a December 2024 ruling granting Madhavi sole decision-making authority, suspending Sunit's parenting time indefinitely, permitting enrollment of the younger child in private school, and denying Sunit's contempt petition. Sunit appealed all rulings to the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District.

The central issues on appeal were whether the modifications were against the manifest weight of the evidence, whether the trial court erred in denying Sunit's contempt petition, and whether various recordings were improperly admitted or considered. The appellate court affirmed on all issues. Under Section 603.10(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the court found sufficient evidence of serious endangerment, including Sunit swearing at and physically intimidating the children, causing one child to urinate on herself and the other to threaten self-harm. The GAL, therapists, custody evaluator, and reunification counselor all recommended restrictions. On contempt, the court held Madhavi's noncompliance was not willful because professionals advised her not to force the children to attend parenting time.

For practitioners, this decision reinforces that credibility determinations and professional recommendations carry substantial weight in parenting time modification proceedings, and that a custodial parent may defeat a contempt finding by demonstrating reliance on therapist and GAL guidance. The court also clarified that evidentiary errors involving recordings are subject to harmless error analysis where the trial court expressly declined to rely on the disputed evidence.

Emma Nyssen filed a petition for a stalking no contact order against Shahryar Zarrinmehr in the Circuit Court of Cook County. After an emergency order was entered and extended multiple times, the trial court entered a plenary stalking no contact order on November 5, 2025, prohibiting Zarrinmehr from contacting Nyssen, approaching her residence or workplace within 100 feet, and possessing a FOID card or firearms. Zarrinmehr appealed pro se, challenging the trial court's factual findings underlying the plenary order.

The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed on two independent grounds. First, Zarrinmehr's brief failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h): his statement of facts contained argument rather than a fair recitation of the record, and he cited no legal authorities whatsoever. The court emphasized that supreme court rules are not mere suggestions and that pro se status confers no procedural leniency. Second, and dispositive, Zarrinmehr failed to include a report of proceedings from the November 5, 2025 hearing, and provided no acceptable substitute such as a bystander's report or agreed statement of facts under Rule 323. Applying Foutch v. O'Bryant, the court presumed the trial court's order conformed with law and had a sufficient factual basis.

This case is a practical reminder that appellate success depends on record preservation and strict compliance with briefing rules. Attorneys representing clients in protection order proceedings should ensure a complete transcript is ordered and that appellate briefs fully comply with Rule 341(h) requirements.

In In re A.E., the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship for minors A.E. and C.D. in Cook County, alleging neglect based on an injurious environment and abuse based on a substantial risk of physical injury following a June 2024 incident in which respondent-mother S.E. allegedly choked A.E. The juvenile court found the minors abused and neglected, adjudged them wards of the court, and denied respondent's motions to compel the minors to testify or be deposed. Respondent appealed both the adjudicatory findings and the denial of her motion to compel testimony.

On the sufficiency of evidence, the appellate court affirmed, holding that the minors' out-of-court statements were admissible under section 2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act and mutually corroborated each other — both reported respondent choked A.E., and bruising was observed on A.E.'s upper lip. The court rejected respondent's argument that physical evidence of choking was required, finding the abuse statute demands only a substantial risk of physical injury. Respondent's extensive DCFS history — 25 investigations, all 11 children removed, and prior abuse findings involving these same minors — was properly considered under section 2-18(3).

On the motion to compel testimony, the court affirmed the trial court's denial, emphasizing that the Juvenile Court Act prioritizes children's best interests over parental litigation interests. Given both minors' documented histories of suicidal ideation, trauma, and emotional dysregulation, their unwillingness to testify, and the availability of their prior statements, compelling testimony would have caused undue harm. Practitioners should note that prior DCFS history and corroborating out-of-court statements can independently sustain abuse and neglect findings, and that courts retain broad discretion to shield traumatized minors from compelled testimony.

This consolidated appeal arose from a Cook County probate guardianship proceeding involving Nora Kornesczuk, an aging woman whose children disagreed about her placement in a residential care facility. After the trial court ordered placement and that ruling was affirmed on appeal, the guardian ad litem (GAL) filed two separate fee petitions. In both instances, the trial court allocated a disproportionate share of the GAL's fees to respondent-appellant James Kornesczuk (Jim), finding that his objections and continued litigation were the sole cause of the GAL's reappointment and the resulting fees. Jim appealed both allocation orders, arguing abuse of discretion, impermissible sanctioning, arbitrariness, and denial of evidentiary hearings.

The Illinois First District Appellate Court affirmed both orders. The court held that Section 11a-10 of the Probate Act vests trial courts with broad discretion to allocate GAL fees, and that which party caused the need for those fees is a recognized and proper consideration. Because Jim's actions alone prompted the GAL's reappointment, allocating a greater share of fees to him was not an abuse of discretion and did not constitute a sanction. The court also rejected Jim's evidentiary hearing arguments, noting that in both proceedings the trial court expressly offered him the opportunity to present evidence or submit written objections, and his counsel declined each time.

For probate and guardianship practitioners, this decision confirms that Illinois courts may look beyond equal division when allocating GAL fees, particularly where one party's litigation conduct is the primary driver of those costs. Attorneys should advise clients that prolonged, unsuccessful opposition in guardianship proceedings can result in disproportionate fee liability, and that declining an offered evidentiary hearing forfeits that argument on appeal.

Regina and Darryl Thomas divorced after a lengthy marriage. Following a bench trial in Cook County, the circuit court divided Regina's CTA pension and the equity in her Matteson home equally between the parties, denied maintenance, and ordered mediation on visitation. Regina appealed, challenging the property allocation. Darryl did not file a response brief, and the appellate court resolved the case on Regina's brief alone. Before reaching the merits, the court confirmed its jurisdiction, holding that under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 272, the 30-day appeal period triggered by the filing of the signed judgment order with the circuit court clerk—not the date the judge signed it. Because the order was clerk-filed on November 6, 2024, and Regina noticed her appeal on December 6, 2024, the appeal was timely.

On the merits, the court applied the Section 503(d) factors of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. It affirmed the trial court's finding that both parties contributed to the marital estate—Darryl's non-financial contributions enabling Regina to work full-time and earn her pension—but found an abuse of discretion in the equal split. The trial court failed to adequately account for the fact that Regina is the sole caregiver and financial provider for Junior, their disabled adult son who cannot live independently, while Darryl bears none of that burden. Invoking Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5), the appellate court modified the judgment directly, awarding Regina two-thirds and Darryl one-third of both the pension and home equity. The court declined to order a separate trust for Junior, treating the adjusted property division as the appropriate remedy.

This decision is significant for family law practitioners because it confirms that a disabled adult child's ongoing care needs are a cognizable factor in marital property division under Section 503(d), and that appellate courts may modify—rather than merely remand—inequitable property allocations when the record is sufficient.

Plaintiff Qusai Alkafaween filed a civil tort action against the Village of New Lenox and two of its police officers after he was struck by a car following a late-night drop-off in an unfamiliar area. Officers had responded to a trespass complaint at Silver Cross Hospital and, rather than arresting plaintiff, transported him to a location near the county line. The trial court granted summary judgment for the New Lenox defendants, finding the officers had transitioned to a community caretaking function triggering absolute immunity under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act. Plaintiff appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District.

The central issue was whether the officers were providing police protection services under section 4-102 (absolute immunity) or executing and enforcing the law under section 2-202 (limited immunity, with a willful and wanton conduct exception). The appellate court reversed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to which provision applied. The court identified competing evidence on both sides: facts suggesting community caretaking (no arrest, calm tone, assurances of assistance) and facts suggesting law enforcement activity (dispatched on a trespass complaint, physically blocking re-entry, transporting plaintiff to a location of the officers' choosing, and an officer describing the act as 'dumping' plaintiff near the county line). The court also declined to apply general discretionary immunity under section 2-201, finding sections 4-102 and 2-202 more specifically addressed the conduct at issue.

For practitioners, this decision underscores that the characterization of police conduct as community caretaking versus law enforcement is ordinarily a question of fact not resolvable on summary judgment when the record supports competing inferences. Attorneys litigating municipal immunity cases should carefully develop the factual record regarding the nature and purpose of officer conduct at each stage of an encounter.

Following the 2019 dissolution of the Moros' marriage, Monika Moro filed multiple post-dissolution motions and petitions seeking back pay of calculated child support and maintenance, contempt findings, and enforcement of a college expense order. The Du Page County circuit court dismissed all of Monika's filings, concluding that prior orders from June 12, 2024, and July 23, 2024 — which set a $24,000 contempt purge amount and subsequently found that purge satisfied — were dispositive under 735 ILCS 5/2-619(4) and barred further litigation of past due support amounts. Monika appealed.

The Third District reversed, finding that the prior orders did not constitute final rulings on the total past due child support and maintenance amounts. The record showed the June 12, 2024, order directed Monika to calculate the exact amount owed and reserved a future ruling, and the case was transferred to a new courtroom before that determination was ever made. Because no final ruling on the past due amounts existed, the prior orders could not serve as a bar under section 2-619(4). The court also found the college expense petition could not logically be barred by orders that never addressed college expenses. However, the court forfeited additional arguments in Monika's brief that were presented without cohesive legal authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7).

For family law practitioners, this decision clarifies that a satisfied contempt purge order does not automatically resolve the underlying question of total arrears, and courts must make an express final ruling on past due amounts before those issues are foreclosed.

Cleother Tidwell, a pro se inmate at Menard Correctional Center, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in Randolph County circuit court against two correctional officers, alleging they physically attacked him while he was handcuffed on April 27, 2021. Only defendant Brandon Edwards was served. Edwards moved to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, asserting failure to state a claim (§ 2-615), failure to exhaust administrative remedies (§ 2-619(a)(9)), and sovereign immunity (§ 2-619(a)(1)). The circuit court granted the motion with prejudice, and later denied Tidwell's motion for reconsideration. Tidwell appealed both rulings.

The Fifth District affirmed on all grounds. On the § 2-615 issue, the court held that Tidwell's complaint was legally insufficient because it failed to identify any deprivation of a property or liberty interest — an essential element of a § 1983 claim — and offered only conclusory allegations. On the § 2-619(a)(9) issue, the court held that Tidwell failed to demonstrate administrative finality because, while he appealed an untimely August 2021 grievance (which was rejected as untimely), he never claimed to have appealed his timely April 27, 2021 grievance to the Administrative Review Board, and no record evidence showed such an appeal. The court declined to reach the sovereign immunity argument as unnecessary.

For practitioners, this decision reinforces that Illinois state courts apply the same rigorous pleading and exhaustion requirements to prisoner § 1983 claims as federal courts. Attorneys advising inmate plaintiffs must ensure both that complaints specifically allege a cognizable constitutional deprivation and that all timely grievances are fully appealed through the ARB before filing suit.

Dr. Kermit Muhammad, an orthopedic and hand surgeon with clinical privileges at Riverside Healthcare, filed suit after Riverside took adverse action against his privileges when he sought a religious exemption from its COVID-19 vaccination policy. His third amended complaint alleged breach of contract, tortious interference, intentional interference with employment contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The circuit court dismissed all counts with prejudice, finding statutory immunity under section 10.2 of the Hospital Licensing Act, mootness as to the breach of contract count, and failure to state a claim on the remaining counts. The Third District reversed in part and affirmed in part.

The appellate court reversed on immunity and mootness. Applying Valfer v. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, the court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a sham peer review purpose — specifically, that defendants used the COVID-19 vaccination policy as a pretext to divert his hand surgery patients to a competing Riverside Medical Group surgeon, supported by specific volume statistics showing a 408-surgery increase for the competitor. The breach of contract count was not moot because plaintiff still sought monetary damages tied to mandatory adverse-action reporting obligations that would affect his insurance rates and practice going forward.

The court affirmed dismissal of the remaining counts. Tortious interference failed because plaintiff did not allege binding contracts with patients or referring physicians, and past relationships alone do not establish a reasonable expectancy of future business. The intentional interference with employment contract claim failed because plaintiff did not plead specific facts showing CEO Kambic acted outside his qualified privilege as a corporate officer. The intentional infliction claim failed for insufficient allegations of extreme and outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress. Attorneys litigating physician credentialing disputes should note that detailed, fact-specific allegations of competitive patient-diversion can overcome statutory peer review immunity at the pleading stage.